

# Authentication I

## *Cryptographic Hardware for Embedded Systems*

### *ECE 3170*

Fall 2025

Assoc. Prof. Vincent John Mooney III

Georgia Institute of Technology

# Reading Assignment

- Please read Chapter 3 of the course textbook by Schneier

# Authentication

- Authentication is the act of declaring something (e.g., a person, a message, or an item such as a car) to be authentic
- An identity is said to be authentic if the claimed identity truly corresponds to the thing (person, message, car, etc.)
  - Example: a car for sale where the owner claims that the car is a Model T Ford
- In our daily lives, we authenticate on a regular basis!
  - With our friends, we recognize their faces
    - Sometimes we make mistakes, e.g., at a long distance from our “friend’s” face
  - We also provide evidence (e.g., a driver’s license) to allow others to authenticate our claims

# Integrity

- Integrity
  - Whole; complete
- Message integrity
  - Verification that a message has not been altered after being sent
  - Example: you want to transfer funds from bank account 1 to bank account 2, and bank 1 needs to verify that the destination bank account has not been changed – in other words, even if the message is from you, if the destination is changed to an adversary's bank in transit, then message integrity has been violated

# Old Fashioned Identity Authentication: Signatures

- Handwriting one's name has been used for millennia
  - Difficult for others to copy
  - Once a contract is signed, the parties are held responsible

# Message Authentication

- Message authentication is the act of declaring a message to be authentic
  - Example #1: receive an email from a foreign country claiming some kind of difficult personal situation
  - Example #2: log in to a secure bank web page and access your account to pay a bill
    - Step 1: <https://bankname.com>
    - Step 2: enter username
    - Step 3: enter password
    - Step 4: click on billpay and enter amount you want to pay to company X
    - ...

# Message Authentication (continued)

- A message is authenticated if the identity of the sender is authenticated and the integrity of the message is verified
  - Step 1: identity authentication
  - Step 2: integrity verification

# Authentication and Repudiation

- Once a sender is authenticated, nonrepudiation does not allow the sender to later claim that the sender did not send the authenticated message




# Protocols

- A protocol is a series of steps involving two or more parties designed to accomplish a task.
  - Everyone involved in the protocol must know the protocol and all of the steps to follow in advance
  - Everyone involved in the protocol must agree to follow it
  - The protocol must be unambiguous, the steps must be well defined, and there must be no change of misunderstanding
  - The protocol must be complete, i.e., there must be a specified action for every possible situation

# First Attempt to Communicate Securely


- Alice and Bob agree on a cryptosystem
- Alice and Bob agree on a symmetric key
- Alice takes her plaintext message and encrypts it using the encryption algorithm and the key, creating a ciphertext message
- Alice sends the ciphertext to Bob
- Bob decrypts the ciphertext message with the same algorithm and key and reads it


# Threat Scenario



# A Second Attempt to Communicate Securely

- A public key cryptosystem infrastructure is made widely available
- Alice obtains Bob's public key from the infrastructure
  - E.g., using a certificate authority (CA)
- Alice encrypts her message using Bob's public key and sends the message to Bob
- Bob then decrypts Alice's message using his private key





Bo  
lap

Pub Bank  
CA

Bank

CA  
GTF  
Pub

GTF  
PRIN



WPA

broken

---

never

# Notation

- $D$ : target device
- $G_U$ : updating organization
- $(G_{pub}, G_{prv})$ : updating organization key pair
- $(D_{pub}, D_{prv})$ : device key pair
- $N_G, N_D$ : organization and device nonces
- $I_G, I_D$ : organization and device identifiers
- $V$ : incoming update version number
- $K_S$ : symmetric key


- $U$ : update image
- $H$ : hash of the update image
- $H_U$ : update hashes sent by  $G_U$
- $\{M\}_{D_{pub}}$ : message  $M$  is encrypted using key  $D_{pub}$ 
  - Notation is common to both symmetric and asymmetric encryption (e.g.,  $\{M\}_{K_S}$ )
- $(G \rightarrow D : M)$ : organization  $G$  sends  $M$  to device  $D$
- $(G \leftarrow D : M)$ : device  $D$  sends  $M$  to organization  $G$

$\{M\}_{D_{pub}}$

$\{M\}_{K_S}$

# Authentication Phase Using Public Key Crypto


1. Organization nonce  $N_G$  and identifier  $I_G$  sent to device
2. Device retrieves  $N_G$ , then appends its own nonce  $N_D$  and identifier  $I_D$
3. Finally, organization responds with  $N_D$  and symmetric key  $K_S$



Bob  $\xrightarrow{\text{pub Alice}}$   $\{NB, TB\}$  pub Eve  
Mallory pub Alice

# Update Phase Using Symmetric Key Crypto


4. Organization sends update  $U$  and hash of the update  $H_U$  using the and symmetric key  $K_S$
5. Device decrypts the message and checks that the (keyless) hash value  $H_U$  is obtained on the update  $U$
6. Finally,  $D$  sends an encrypted message indicating that the update is complete



Cost of  
attack < value  
of device

# Long Term Asymmetric Keys, Short Term Symmetric Session Key

- New symmetric session key generated by updating organization on every update
  - Shared during authentication phase
- Advantages
  - Decryption of update code faster than asymmetric
  - Higher security
- Disadvantages
  - Device has a higher implementation overhead in order to support asymmetric as well as symmetric crypto




# Security Analysis

1. Man in the middle
2. Replay attack
3. Organization spoofing




# Man in the Middle

- Attacker tries to place himself between the updating organization and the device
- Attack fails because
  1. Authentication requires possession of private key
  2. All communication is encrypted
- Note that the assumption is that the public keys are correct



# Replay Attack

- Attacker saves previous authentication and replays it
- Replay will be denied
  - Nonce used prevents successful replay



# Organization Spoofing

- Attacker claims to be the updating organization
  - Pushes out malicious update
- Authentication will fail
  - Organization public key statically stored on Device
- Device will deny the update

